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NOTES
WEIGHING IN ON THE WINE WARS: WHAT THE EUROPEAN
UNION CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE DIRECT SHIPMENT
CONTROVERSY
INTRODUCTION
Suppose you run a small Virginia winery that produces a white
wine that has long been the favorite of traveling oenophiles from
Tennessee who annually make the trip to visit your winery and
taste your product. You might believe the rising popularity of
electronic commerce and mail-order shopping is a godsend, allowing
you to increase the volume of orders received from your loyal
Tennessee customers and their friends who have been clued in to
your wine. Under Tennessee law,1 however, and the law of six other
states,2 every time you ship an order of wine to a Tennessee buyer,
you are committing a felony. Tennessee is one of twenty-six states
3
that regulates the importation of alcohol into its borders by
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-401(a) (2002) ("It is unlawful for any person ... to transport
... untaxed alcoholic beverages ... into ... the state of Tennessee, in quantities in excess of three
gallons .... A violation of this subsection is a Class E felony.").
2. In addition to Tennessee, the states of Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
and Utah have all enacted felony direct-shipment laws. See Wine Inst., State-by-State
Analysis: Summaries & Statutes (2002), at http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/
analysis/state-analysis.htm (last modified Aug. 17, 2004). Under Indiana law, it is a felony
for a non-basic permit holder to ship directly to an Indiana consumer; the penalty for wineries
is a misdemeanor charge. Id.
3. See Marcia Coyle, Can This Wine Travel? State Trade Bans Could Be Headed for the
Supreme Court, NAT'L L.J., July 28, 2003, at 1.
1533
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
prohibiting the direct shipment of alcohol to consumers by any
supplier, retailer, or wholesaler, without a permit. These laws are
commonly known as "direct shipment laws. 4
This Note analyzes direct shipment laws in the United States by
comparing them with the decisions of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) that have protected the European Union's (EU) common
market by responding to EU member states' attempts to restrict the
importation of alcoholic beverages into their borders. A comparison
between the United States and the EU is particularly helpful,
because the ECJ has been faced with a task analogous to that
faced by U.S. courts-balancing an interest in free, unfettered
trade among member states against the interest of those states
in regulating alcohol. This Note argues that U.S. direct shipment
laws create an impermissible barrier to interstate trade and
are, therefore, per se infringements of the Commerce Clause.
Furthermore, it contends that the Twenty-First Amendment's grant
of alcohol regulation authority to the states does not validate the
infringements of the Commerce Clause by these direct shipment
laws.
Part I of this Note introduces the parties involved in direct
shipment law litigation and outlines their general arguments. Part
II describes the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and provides a
review of the history of state alcohol regulation that led to the the
Twenty-First Amendment. Part III addresses the legislative intent
behind the Twenty-First Amendment and the subsequent Supreme
Court decisions interpreting Section 2 of the Amendment.5 Part IV
examines the recent direct shipment law litigation. In particular, it
analyzes the opposing decisions of the Seventh Circuit,' which
upheld Indiana's direct shipment prohibition, and the Fourth7 and
4. Id.
5. The first two sections of the Twenty-First Amendment state:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
6. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
7. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Fifth Circuits,8 which struck down direct shipment prohibition laws.
Part V of this Note considers EU free market regulations and the
ECJ's decisions interpreting the EU member states' alcohol
restrictions in light of the EU common market. Finally, in Part VI,
this Note suggests that the EU's approach is a workable method in
the United States that would strike a proper balance between the
dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment in
direct shipment law litigation. The EU's prohibition on any
obstacles to free movement that result from disparities between
member state laws relating to the importation of alcohol is consis-
tent with the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and is not
barred by the Twenty-First Amendment.
I. THE INTERESTS INVOLVED IN DIRECT SHIPMENT LAW LITIGATION
States generally have one of three types of direct shipment laws.
Thirteen states currently employ a reciprocity policy, in which the
state allows direct shipments only from states that afford the same
reciprocal privilege.' These reciprocal agreements limit the amount
of wine ordered per person and restrict the orders to purchases only
for personal consumption. ° Sixteen states allow for limited direct
shipping, with restrictions ranging from allowing only wine ordered
on-site at an out-of-state winery to be shipped," to permitting out-
of-state wineries to ship a limited number of cases to in-state
8. Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
9. See Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate
Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1648-49 n.135 (2000). Since the
publication of Douglass's review of state direct shipment laws, Hawaii has amended its
statute to reciprocate with states that utilize the same policy. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 281-33.5
(Supp. 2003).
10. See Wine Inst., supra note 2.
11. Three states-Arizona, Georgia, and Rhode Island-allow for a resident to ship back
to their homes cases of wine that were purchased on-site at a winery. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 4-203.04.J (West Supp. 2003) (permitting shipment of up to two cases annually to an
Arizona residential address if the person ordered the wine on-site at a winery); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 3-3-8, 3-6-32 (2000) (permitting up to five cases to be shipped to a Georgia resident who has
ordered wine on the premises of a winery); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-4-8 (Supp. 2003) (permitting
out-of-state wineries to ship wine orders that are "personally placed by the purchaser at the
manufacturer's premises, for shipment to an address in Rhode Island for [a] nonbusiness
purpose").
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residents.12 The remaining twenty-one states completely prohibit
the direct shipment of alcohol to a consumer from an out-of-state
seller.13
Rather than allow producers of wine to sell directly to consumers,
most states regulate the sale and distribution of alcohol by private
retailers through a three-tiered system of circulation. 4 A producer
12. Alaska, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming have all enacted legislation that allows
for limited amounts of wine to be shipped directly from out-of-state wineries. See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 4.11.060, 4.11.160; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:359 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)
(permitting a licensed manufacturer or retailer in another state to directly ship up to forty-
eight 750 milliliter bottles of wine per year to an adult Louisiana resident, provided the
shipper attains a direct shipping permit from Louisiana and pays all state liquor taxes);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4-901 to 16-4-903 (2003) (requiring an adult Montana resident to
obtain a connoisseur's permit to receive up to twelve cases per year from an out-of-state
winery, provided the shipper is registered with Montana and the recipient reports and files
all taxes with the state); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-194.03 (1998) (permitting Nebraska consumers
to receive by direct shipment up to nine liters per month for personal use); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 369.490 (Michie 1999) (allowing a Nevada resident to import directly from another
state up to twelve cases of wine per year for personal consumption); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
178:14-a (2001) (limiting a direct shipper to sixty individual containers of not more than one
liter each to any consumer in New Hampshire in a calendar year); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-
1001.1 (2003) (allowing holders of a federal basic wine manufacturing permit to obtain a wine
shipper permit and ship up to two cases of wine per month to any individual purchaser for
personal use); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-16 (1987 & Supp. 2003) (allowing direct shipments of
up to nine liters of wine per month for personal use, provided the seller obtains a direct
shipment permit); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-747 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2003) (allowing
holders of a wine shipper's license and permit to sell and ship up to twenty-four bottles of
wine per month to a South Carolina resident); VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-112.1 (West 2001 & Supp.
2004) (allowing up to two cases per month to be shipped by a holder of a wine shipper's license
to any legal consumer in Virginia); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204 (Michie 2003) (allowing
licensed out-of-state shippers to import up to eighteen liters of wine to any one household
within any twelve-month period).
13. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont prohibit direct shipment of wine
to consumers. Wine Inst., Direct Shipment Laws by State for Wineries (2004), at
http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/analysis/intro analysis.htm (last modified Oct. 20,
2004). These laws "either explicitly criminalize direct shipment from producers to customers
or do so implicitly by requiring that all commerce in alcoholic beverages be transacted through
state-enforced distribution systems." Douglass, supra note 9, at 1649 n.136.
14. See Douglass, supra note 9, at 1621; Russ Miller, Note, The Wine Is in the Mail: The
Twenty-First Amendment and State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages,
54 VAND. L. REV. 2495, 2496-97 (2001); Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws,
the Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV. 353, 355 (1999).
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of wine'5 must obtain a permit through the state to sell its product.' 6
The producer may sell only to a licensed wholesaler, who collects
excise taxes from the producer and provides the state with informa-
tion about the suppliers and the alcohol they import. 7 The whole-
saler then sells and delivers the wine to a retail outlet within the
state, profiting by charging a higher price than they paid to the
suppliers.' 8 The retailers, in turn, sell to the consumer and make a
profit by charging a higher price than they paid to the wholesalers.'
9
By limiting the issuance of permits to producers and the issuance of
licenses to wholesalers and retailers, the state is able to control the
types, amounts, and producers of alcohol sold in its territory, and
increase its tax revenue by collecting taxes on each sale of the
alcohol.
In addition to the increased tax burden levied on consumers by
mandating the three-tiered wholesaler system, a recent report by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reveals a second hardship
that direct shipping laws impose on consumers.20 An empirical study
conducted by the FTC concluded that wine consumers could save as
much as twenty-one percent on wine purchases by shopping on the
internet.2' Yet, this avenue is unavailable for those consumers who
live in states that prohibit the direct shipment of alcohol to consum-
ers. As the report states, "[s]tate bans on interstate direct shipping
represent the single largest regulatory barrier to expanded e-
,,22
commerce in wine.
The report also provides evidence that counters two common
justifications for direct shipment legislation. Although the report
acknowledges that citizens are "concerned about the direct shipment
15. Direct shipment laws apply to all alcoholic beverages. Because of the sharp increase
in the number of small wineries and the rising demand for limited-production wines, however,
the wine sector of the alcohol industry is particularly affected by the prohibition of direct
shipment sales by out-of-state producers. See Douglass, supra note 9, at 1619 n.1; James
Molnar, Comment, Under the Influence: Why Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws Are a Violation
of the Commerce Clause, 9 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 169, 174 (2001).




20. Fed. Trade Comm'n, E-commerce Lowers Prices, Increases Choices in Wine Market
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of wine to minors" and that states have responded "in part by
banning direct shipment of wine to all consumers, or banning direct
shipment from out-of-state sellers," the study's data reveals that
"states that permit interstate direct shipping generally report few
or no problems with shipments to minors. ' 23 Furthermore, the
report indicates that states that do allow interstate direct shipping
are able to collect taxes from out-of-state sellers by requiring these
vendors to obtain permits and comply with their tax laws. 4 Thus,
concerns by state legislators that out-of-state sellers will be out of
their taxing reach, thereby putting in-state sellers at a competitive
disadvantage and causing a significant loss in tax revenue to the
state, can be mitigated by other measures.
Aside from preventing oenophiles the opportunity to purchase
out-of-state wines that may not be carried by their states' wholesal-
ers, the mandatory three-tier system particularly affects two types
of wineries. Small, "mom-and-pop" wineries that lack the name
recognition to get wholesalers to carry their labels are completely
excluded from out-of-state sales if they fail to get distributorship of
their product from a wholesaler." Consequently, the existence of
other opportunities for these wineries to reach customers is
essential to their survival. This problem has only increased with
time, as the number of wholesalers has shrunk from 10,900 to 300
since 1963, making it increasingly difficult for smaller wineries to
get a wholesaler to carry its label.26 A 2003 survey of Wine Institute
members bears this problem out, as fifty-four percent of the
wineries who responded declared that they were unable to gain
access to another state's market due to an inability to find a
wholesaler willing to carry their brands.27
23. Id. To combat the possibility of minors obtaining alcohol through internet purchases,
some states have required that package delivery companies get an adult's signature upon
delivery. Id. States have also established penalty and enforcement systems to compel
compliance with these safeguard requirements. Id.
24. Id. The report concludes that "[m]ost of these states report few, if any, problems with
tax collection."
25. Coyle, supra note 3, at 1, 30.
26. Molnar, supra note 15, at 173.
27. News Release, Wine Institute, Wine Institute Statement (Oct. 29, 2003), at
http://www.wineinstitute.org/communications/statistics/dirshiplO.30.03.htm. This statistic
reveals an increasing inability on the part of wineries to have their brands carried by
wholesalers. See Alix M. Freedman & John R. Emshwiller, Vintage System: Big Liquor
1538 [Vol. 46:1533
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The direct shipment laws also adversely affect highly respected
boutique wineries, which can sell all of their yearly production
without the aid of the wholesalers.28 Without the mandatory three-
tier system, these producers could sell their wines at a higher price
to consumers, rather than have the wholesalers and retailers
increase transaction costs.
The constitutionality of direct shipment laws that prohibit the
direct delivery to consumers from out-of-state producers has been
challenged recently in twelve states.29 Opponents of these
laws-typically winery owners, oenophiles, and food critics-argue
that the laws discriminate against out-of-state vintners and favor
in-state producers, a violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.3 ° The challengers rely on the dormant Commerce
Clause, contending that because many of the states that ban
interstate direct shipping allow intrastate direct shipment of
alcohol, the laws are prejudiced against out-of-state wineries.3
Thus, they argue that the basis for these laws is economic protec-
tionism and that the Twenty-First Amendment cannot be used as
a pretext for protectionism. Proponents of these laws-state
legislatures and alcoholic beverage wholesalers-argue that the
laws are a constitutional use of state power conferred upon the
states by Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.33 They argue that although the dormant Commerce
Wholesaler Finds Change Stalking Its Very Private World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1999, at Al.
28. Coyle, supra note 3, at 30.
29. The direct shipment laws in the following states have been subject to recent decisions:
Florida (Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002) (vacating the district court's
decision in Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2001))); Indiana (Bridenbaugh
v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000)); Kansas (Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co. v.
Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2001)); Michigan (Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th
Cir. 2003)), New York (Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2nd Cir. 2004)); North Carolina
(Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003)); and Texas (Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d
388 (5th Cir. 2003)). In addition, lawsuits have been filed in five other states - Arizona, New
Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Washington. See Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Am. Inc.,
Direct Shipping Litigation, at http://www.wswa.org/public/legal/direct.html (last modified July
29, 2004).
30. See, e.g., Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 392; Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 848.
31. See, e.g., Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 393; Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851.
32. See, e.g., Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 393; Beskind, 325 F.3d at 5094; Bridenbaugh, 227
F.3d at 851; Coyle, supra note 3, at 1.
33. See, e.g., Beskind, 325 F.3d at 509; Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 849.
15392005]
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Clause prohibits discriminatory practices against out-of-state
producers, the Twenty-First Amendment is an exception to this
general principle, and states have the right to regulate alcohol as
they see fit.
34
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND PRE-PROHIBITION STATE
ALCOHOL REGULATION
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
power "[t] o regulate Commerce ... among the several States."" Along
with its affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce, the Commerce Clause also has a logical corollary,
long recognized by the Supreme Court, that "imposes limitations on
the States in the absence of congressional action.""6 The underlying
principle behind this dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is that
"one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a
position of economic isolation.""a Thus, the dormant Commerce
Clause "prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory mea-
sures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors."3
The Supreme Court has identified and distinguished two types of
state regulations that violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The
first type of impermissible regulation is one that is nondiscrimina-
tory against out-of-state interests on its face and is supported by a
legitimate state interest, but that nonetheless incidentally burdens
interstate commerce.39 In assessing the constitutionality of such a
34. See, e.g., Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 849. Of the five recent federal court of appeals
decisions assessing the constitutionality of these direct shipment laws, only Judge
Easterbrook's opinion in Bridenbaugh upholds a state's direct shipment law. See
Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 854.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 401 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
37. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949) (quoting Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925)).
38. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988)).
39. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
1540 [Vol. 46:1533
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state law, the Court will uphold the law unless the burden imposed
on interstate commerce is clearly disproportionate to the local
benefits. 4' The degree of proportionality depends on the nature of
the local interest involved and on whether it could be promoted
equally as well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.4 '
The second way a state law can violate the dormant Commerce
Clause is by clearly discriminating against interstate commerce,
either facially or through the law's practical effect. 42 To survive a
constitutional challenge, the state must "demonstrate both that the
statute 'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and that this purpose
could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means."43
This burden has proven difficult to meet. Maine v. Taylor presents
the only example in which the Court has held that a state's
discriminatory statute does not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. 44 As Justice Marshall summarized the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, "[wihen a state statute directly ...
discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to
favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have
generally struck down the statute without further inquiry."45
40. Id. at 142.
41. Id. In Pike, the Court held that the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act,
which prohibited the interstate shipment of cantaloupes not packaged in containers in a
manner and of a kind approved by the government, violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Court found that the burden on the out-of-state growers spending $200,000 on a packing
plant in lieu of sending their cantaloupes to nearby Blythe, California, for
packaging--outweighed the legitimate state interest in promoting and preserving the
reputation of Arizona growers. See id. at 142-46.
42. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). Carbone involved a "flow
control ordinance" that required all solid waste to be processed at a designated transfer
station before leaving the town of Clarkstown. The statute was held to violate the Commerce
Clause, because it deprived out-of-state competitors access to a local market. Id. at 386.
43. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332,
336 (1979)). This test has been identified as a type of strict scrutiny analysis. See Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 n.12 (1992).
44. Miller, supra note 14, at 2501 n.35. The Maine statute challenged in Maine v. Taylor,
which banned the importation of live baitfish from outside the state because of the harmful
effects that baitfish parasites would have on the state's population of wild fish, survived strict
scrutiny analysis. The Court reasoned that Maine had a legitimate purpose to treat out-of-
state baitfish differently, and noted that the district court had found that scientific techniques
to sample and inspect live baitfish had not been developed. The Court concluded, therefore,
that there were no alternative means to promote the state's interest without discriminating
against interstate commerce. Maine, 477 U.S. at 146-52.
45. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).
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Direct shipment laws that discriminate against out-of-state
sellers by prohibiting interstate sales directly to consumers, while
allowing in-state wineries to ship directly to in-state consumers,46
are challenged under the per se analysis; that is, opponents of these
laws claim that the statutes are impermissibly protectionist on their
face. 4' These state direct shipment laws, it is therefore claimed,
must be examined under a strict scrutiny analysis. 41
B. Pre-Prohibition State Regulation of Alcohol
State regulation of the sale of alcohol has a long history in the
United States. The first challenge to state regulation of alcohol on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds came in 1847, when Massachu-
setts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire enacted laws requiring its
citizens to obtain a license to sell alcohol within their respective
borders.49 Through six separate opinions in the License Cases, the
Supreme Court conveyed a position that supported broad state
power to regulate the sale of alcohol relatively unobstructed by the
dormant Commerce Clause.5" As Chief Justice Taney wrote in his
majority opinion, "I see nothing in the constitution of the United
States to prevent [states] from regulating and restraining the
traffic, or from prohibiting [the sale of alcohol] altogether, if [the
state] thinks proper."'" The Court later held that this broad state
authority includes the power to forbid the in-state production and
distribution of alcoholic beverages.52
46. States with such discriminatory laws are: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and
Vermont. See supra note 13.
47. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2003) ('The challenged
provisions of the [statute] facially discriminate against out-of-state economic interests.").
48. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) ("[Flacial discrimination
invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of [sic] the
absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.").
49. See Miller, supra note 14, at 2503.
50. See id. (citing Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847)). Thurlow
incorporated challenges to all three state statutes. The cases were argued together and were
commonly known as the "License Cases." Id.
51. Thurlow, 46 U.S. at 577.
52. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 659 (1887) ("[A] State law prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution
1542 [Vol. 46:1533
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The era of the Court's recognition of broad state authority to
regulate alcohol ended as the dawn of the twentieth century drew
near. In Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., the Court
struck down an Iowa law that forbade any common carrier from
importing into the state any intoxicating liquors without a permit.53
The Court found that the Iowa statute was an improper use of the
state's police power, as it regulated interstate commerce "before the
merchandise is brought to its border," an impermissible regulation
in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.54 The Court thus
abolished any notion that state power to control alcohol was
unfettered by the dormant Commerce Clause.
Iowa responded by passing a law that banned the sale of liquor
produced both inside and outside the state.55 The law was chal-
lenged by John Leisy, who received sealed kegs and cases of beer
from Peoria, Illinois, and sold them in Iowa without removing the
alcohol from their original sealed packages.56 The Court ruled the
police seizure of Leisy's alcohol invalid, holding that the beer
remained an article of interstate commerce, and thus out of the
state's reach, as long as it remained in its original package. 7 To the
Leisy Court, to grant the state of Iowa the ability to exclude articles
of interstate commerce would be granting a state the "power to
regulate commercial intercourse between the States," a power
expressly conferred to Congress in the Commerce Clause.5"
The decision by the Leisy Court mandating that the importation
of alcohol not be prohibited by any state, coupled with the Mugler
decision upholding the rights of states to regulate alcohol by
requiring that in-state producers have a license to manufacture
alcohol or to forbid the in-state production of alcohol altogether,
produced a curious loophole that was recognized by the Leisy Court
of the United States."' (quoting Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877))).
53. 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
54. Id. at 498.
55. See Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A Brewing Debate: Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws and
the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 766 (citing IOWA CODE §§ 1523, 1540-
1555 (1873)); see also Miller, supra note 14, at 2505-06.
56. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 100 (1890).
57. Id. at 124-25.
58. Id. at 125.
2005] 1543
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itself.59 As the Seventh Circuit recently noted, "[T]he combination
of Leisy and Mugler meant that states could forbid domestic
production of alcoholic beverages but could not stop imports; the
Constitution effectively favored out-of-state sellers."6
Congress responded to the Court's prodding in Leisy by passing
the Wilson Act in 1890. The Wilson Act gave states the authority to
regulate liquor shipped into the state "to the same extent and in the
same manner" as liquor produced in-state. 1 The Wilson Act further
eliminated the significance of retaining the alcohol in its original
packaging.6 Although the Wilson Act was effectively a states' rights
bill, giving states the authority to regulate alcohol as they saw fit,
it stopped short of allowing state control of alcohol to be an excep-
tion to the dormant Commerce Clause. The Act forbade states from
discriminating against out-of-state sellers, as out-of-state liquor was
subject to the same laws as in-state liquor and was to be regulated
in the same manner and to the same extent as liquor produced in-
state.63
Though the Wilson Act effectively closed the "Leisy loophole,' 64 it
allowed out-of-state sellers to bypass state regulation by selling
liquor directly to consumers through mail order. 5 Congress closed
this loophole in 1913 with the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act,
which provided that "[t]he shipment or transportation ... of any ...
59. The Court urged Congress to use its authority to regulate interstate commerce to
correct the loophole. See id. at 123-24 ("[Tlhe responsibility is upon Congress ... to remove the
restriction upon the State in dealing with imported articles of trade within its limits...."). Id.
60. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000).
61. 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2004).
All ... intoxicating liquors ... transported into any State ... shall upon arrival in
such State ... be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State ...
to the same extent and in the same manner as though such ... liquors had been
produced in such State ... and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being
introduced therein in original packages or otherwise.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. For a discussion of the legislative intent behind the Wilson Act, see Miller, supra
note 14, at 2507-08 (noting that the Wilson Act was not designed "to further temperance
objectives, but rather to give states the power 'to do as they please in regard to the liquor
question"').
64. See Patterson, supra note 55, at 767.
65. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898) (holding that Iowa's prohibition on shipping
alcohol violates the Commerce Clause when applied to delivery of an unopened box of liquor
bottles received from an out-of-state shipper).
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intoxicating liquor ... into any State ... in violation of any law of such
State ... is hereby prohibited.""6 The combination of the Wilson Act
and the Webb-Kenyon Act "authorized States to apply their State
laws governing alcoholic beverages within the State to alcoholic
beverages that originated outside the State."67 Although Congress
had conferred upon the states the power to regulate the sale of
alcoholic beverages that were imported from out-of-state, the
prohibitionists' push for a Constitutional amendment to ban alcohol
nationally ended the movement toward state and local regulation of
liquor.68
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EARLY SUPREME COURT
INTERPRETATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Textual and Legislative History
An analysis of the interplay between the Twenty-First Amend-
ment and the dormant Commerce Clause must begin with an
examination of the Amendment's text.69 The text sheds little light
on how the framers intended the Amendment to relate to the
Commerce Clause, however, as the wording of the Amendment
suggests two equally valid interpretations." One interpretation,
labeled the "unconditional grant" theory,71 is that the Amendment
should be read as completely exempting state regulation of alcohol
from other constitutional restrictions such as those found in the
Commerce Clause. 72 The Court has expressly rejected this interpre-
tation, as its analysis of Section 2 has made it clear that the
66. 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2004).
67. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2003).
68. See Patterson, supra note 55, at 768.
69. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840) ("In expounding the
Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate
meaning ...."); see also Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938); Douglass, supra note
9, at 1629 n.50.
70. See Douglass, supra note 9, at 1629.
71. See Patterson, supra note 55, at 771-72.
72. Id.
73. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984) ("It is by now clear that
the [Twenty-First) Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages
from the ambit of the Commerce Clause.").
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Amendment must be read in light of the rest of the Constitution. v4
A more restrictive reading of Section 2 interprets it as merely
reverting the responsibility to regulate alcohol back to the states,
thus presuming that state laws will not offend the Commerce
Clause or any other constitutional power of the federal govern-
ment. 5 This interpretation is also known as the "conditional grant"
theory. 6
The legislative history behind the passage of the Twenty-First
Amendment is similarly ambiguous.7 7 Statements by supporters
of Senate Joint Resolution 211, the original bill that later became
the Twenty-First Amendment, support both interpretations." In
addition, the legislative history reveals a third interpretation of
Section 2-that it was included purely to protect the rights of states
who wished to remain dry after the repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment. Senator Blaine, the Senate sponsor of the Amendment
resolution, remarked that "[t]he [Senate Judiciary] [C]ommittee felt
... that we could well afford to guarantee to the so-called dry States
the protection designed by section two."7 9 Ultimately, the legislative
history behind the passage of Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment sheds little light on the ambiguous language of its text.
74. See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964) (stating
that "[b]oth the Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same
Constitution [and] each must be considered in the light of the other").
75. See Douglass, supra note 9, at 1630 (arguing that Section 2 of the Commerce Clause
does not expand the powers of the states to regulate alcohol beyond the authority they had
before the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment).
76. See Patterson, supra note 55, at 771.
77. Justice Powell argued that the Court has focused on the text of the Amendment rather
than its legislative history in large part due to "sketchy records of the state conventions" and
contradictory statements by the Amendment's framers in support of the Amendment. See Cal.
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106-07 n.10 (1980).
78. Douglass, supra note 9, at 1631-36. Conflicting remarks by Senator Blaine illustrate
the cloudy legislative history behind the passage of the Amendment. At one time Senator
Blaine said the purpose of Section 2 was "to restore to the States ... absolute control in effect
over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors." Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 106-
07 n.10 (quoting 76 CONG. REC. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Blaine)). He also remarked,
however, that Section 2 was necessary to include in the amendment "to assure the so-called
dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States." 76 CONG. REC.
4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
79. Douglass, supra note 9, at 1632 n.61 (quoting 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement
of Sen. Blaine)).
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Perhaps the most informative source of the framers' intent in the
passage of the Twenty-First Amendment is found in the language
of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts. As both commentators and
courts have observed,8 ° the language of Section 2 closely follows that
of these pre-prohibition Acts.81 If the framers were seeking to
incorporate the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts into the Amendment,
this implies that they were seeking to return to the pre-prohibition
relationship between the state alcohol regulatory laws and the
dormant Commerce Clause. The Court addressed this implication
in Craig v. Boren when it noted the "framers' clear intention of
constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established
under those statutes." 2 It is thus reasonable to conclude that the
framers of the Twenty-First Amendment intended for states to be
able to regulate alcoholic beverages that originated from out-of-
state sources, but only to the same extent and in the same manner
as state regulation of alcoholic beverages produced in-state.
Consequently, under this interpretation, the framers intended that
states could not discriminate against out-of-state sellers.
B. Early Twenty-First Amendment Interpretations
Faced with the three possible readings of Section 2's text, the
Supreme Court clearly embraced the unconditional grant theory in
its first interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment. In State
Board of Equalization v. Young's Market, the Court sustained a
California law that imposed a license fee of $500 for the right to
80. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976) (' The wording of § 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts ...."); see also Bridenbaugh
v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Section 2 tracks the Webb-Kenyon Act
and effectively incorporates its approach into the Constitution."); Patterson, supra note 55,
at 767-68.
81. Compare 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2004) ("All ... intoxicating liquors ... transported into any
State or Territory ... for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such
State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory
'.... ), and 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2004) ("'The shipment or transportation ... of any ... intoxicating
liquor of any kind ... into any State, Territory, or District of the United States ... in violation
of any law of such State ... is prohibited."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 ('The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.").
82. Craig, 429 U.S. at 205-06.
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import beer into the state but that exempted in-state beer producers
from the fee, holding that the Twenty-First Amendment completely
exempted states from dormant Commerce Clause restrictions.83 The
Young's Market plaintiffs argued for the conditional grant reading
of Section 2, but the Court explicitly denounced such an interpreta-
tion:
[The plaintiffs] request us to construe the Amendment as saying,
in effect: The State may prohibit the importation of intoxicating
liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within its
borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must let
imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal terms. To
say that, would involve not a construction of the Amendment,
but a rewriting of it."
The view espoused in Young's Market and its progeny 5 governed
Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence until 1964, when the Court
held for the first time since Young's Market that the Commerce
Clause prohibited certain state regulation of alcohol.8 6 In Hostetter,
the Court held that a state could not constitutionally regulate the
sale of alcoholic beverages destined for foreign countries, as the
Commerce Clause explicitly granted the federal government the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.87
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart acknowledged that the
Court's early decisions interpreting the Twenty-First Amendment
"made clear" that "a State is totally unconfined by traditional
Commerce Clause limitations" when it regulated the importation
of alcohol into its borders."8 Yet, Justice Stewart criticized as an
"absurd oversimplification" the conclusion that the Twenty-First
Amendment "repeal[ed]" the Commerce Clause as to state regula-
83. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936).
84. Id. at 62.
85. For example, in Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, the Court
reiterated its interpretation that the Commerce Clause did not impede a state's ability to
regulate alcohol under the Twenty-First Amendment. As Justice Brandeis wrote, "[s]ince the
Twenty-first Amendment, as held in the [Young's Market] case, the right of a state to prohibit
or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause."
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939).
86. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
87. Id. at 329-34.
88. Id. at 330.
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tion of alcohol.8 9 Rather, Justice Stewart viewed the Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment as two "parts of the same
Constitution."9 Although not expressly overruling Young's Market,
the decision in Hostetter signaled an unmistakable shift in the
Court's interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment. No longer
would the Court simply defer to the Twenty-First Amendment, and
ignore the Commerce Clause, when faced with state regulation of
the importation of alcohol. Following Hostetter, each provision of the
Constitution would be "considered in the light of the other, and in
the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete
case."
91
C. Developing a Balancing Test
Since Hostetter, the Court has developed a balancing test to
address challenges to state alcohol regulations on Commerce Clause
grounds. The Court's two-pronged test balances the state's interest
in regulating alcohol against the federal interest in regulating
interstate commerce. The Court first addresses whether the state
statute contravenes either an affirmative exercise of the Commerce
Clause92 or the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 93 If the Court
deems that there is no conflict between the state statute and the
Commerce Clause, then the statute will be upheld.
If the statute does conflict with federal law, the Court considers
the second prong of the test-whether the Twenty-First Amendment
"saves" the state regulation. 94 Commonly known as the "core
89. Id. at 331-32. Justice Stewart cited as support the Court's rejection of the
unconditional grant theory in Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1939).
Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332. In Jameson, the Court had stated that they saw "no substance in
th[e] contention" that the Twenty-First Amendment "gives to the States complete and
exclusive control over commerce in intoxicating liquors, unlimited by the commerce clause...."
Jameson, 307 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added).
90. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332.
91. Id.
92. Miller, supra note 14, at 2523 (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980) (asserting that a state cannot pass a law that
prevents actions allowed by federal law)).
93. Miller, supra note 14, at 2523 (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268
(1984)).
94. See Miller, supra note 14, at 2523-24.
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concerns" test,95 the Court assesses the weight of the state interest
by examining whether the state regulation was passed pursuant to
the central purpose of Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.96
Generally, the Supreme Court and lower courts have understood the
central purpose behind the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment
to be the promotion of temperance.9" Consequently, for the Twenty-
First Amendment to "save" a state statute that violates the dormant
Commerce Clause, the statute must be passed and enforced to
promote temperance and not to promote economic discrimination
against out-of-state interests.98
IV. RECENT DIRECT SHIPMENT DECISIONS
The conflict between the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First
Amendment has given rise to a wave of challenges to state direct
shipment laws in recent years. Since 2000, six federal courts of
appeals have weighed in on the constitutionality of these state
alcohol regulations. The majority of courts have concluded that
state alcohol laws that discriminate against out-of-state interests
cannot be saved by the Twenty-First Amendment because they are
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to promote the core concern of
temperance. 99
95. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2003).
96. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276 ("The central purpose of [Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment] was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by
erecting barriers to competition."); Quality Brands, Inc. v. Barry, 715 F. Supp. 1138 (D.D.C.
1989); Shanker, supra note 14, at 375.
97. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276 ("[Ihe State does not seek to justify its tax
on the ground that it was designed to promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose
of the Twenty-first Amendment ...."); Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, 601 F. Supp. 850, 861
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[W]hat is to be balanced is the state interest in promoting 'temperance' with
the federal constitutional interest in free trade across state lines. Only those state restrictions
which directly promote temperance may now be said to be permissible under Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment."). Other courts have identified the "collection of taxes" and "the
prevention of monopolies or organized crime from (re)gaining control of the alcohol industry"
as concerns of the Amendment. See Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 404 & n.71.
98. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276; Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,
716 (1984) (identifying the "state's central power under the Twenty-first Amendment" as the
power to "regulat[e] the times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported and
sold").
99. See Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388
(5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
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A. Decisions Upholding Direct Shipment Laws
The first challenge to state direct shipment laws to be reviewed
by a federal court of appeals resulted in the state statute being
upheld. In Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson,"" the Seventh Circuit
held that an Indiana statute prohibiting direct shipments from
out-of-state producers to Indiana consumers 0 1 was authorized by
the Twenty-First Amendment. 10 2 The Indiana statute at issue in
Bridenbaugh establishes the common three-tiered regulatory
scheme that requires different permits for manufacturers, distribu-
tors, and retailers. °3 The Bridenbaugh plaintiffs, Indiana oeno-
philes, challenged the state regulation because it permitted Indiana
wineries to ship directly to Indiana consumers while forbidding out-
of-state wineries from doing so. 0 4
Judge Easterbrook's opinion explicitly disavowed any consider-
ation of whether the Indiana regulatory scheme furthered a "core
concern" authorized by the Twenty-First Amendment. 105 Rather,
using the "text and history of the Constitution" as its "guide," the
court concluded that the history behind the Twenty-First Amend-
ment reveals that it "enables a state to do to importation of
liquor-including direct deliveries to consumers in original
packages-what it chooses to do to internal sales of liquor, but
nothing more."'0 6 Using nondiscrimination against out-of-state
interests as the litmus test for upholding the state regulatory
scheme, the court determined that the Indiana statute did not favor
Indiana sources of alcoholic beverages over outside sources.
"Indiana insists that every drop of liquor pass through its three-
tiered system and be subjected to taxation. Wine originating in
California, France, Australia, or Indiana passes through the same
three tiers and is subjected to the same taxes. Where's the func-
tional discrimination?" asked the court. 107
100. 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
101. IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) (2001).
102. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 854.
103. Id. at 851; see generally supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
104. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 849.
105. Id. at 851.
106. Id. at 851, 853.
107. Id. at 853.
2005] 1551
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The most recent federal circuit court to weigh in on the direct
shipment controversy also upheld the state statute at issue. In
Swedenburg v. Kelly,' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld a New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (ABC Law) that
required all wineries who sell to New York consumers to obtain a
license and otherwise participate in the three-tiered system."°9 As
the court pointed out, the New York statute differed from those
statues challenged in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, as out-
of-state wineries were not wholly prevented from obtaining a
license."' Rather, the Swedenburg plaintiffs complained that the
ABC Law's licensing requirement that wineries establish and
maintain a physical presence in New York provided an unconstitu-
tional advantage to in-state wineries."' Like the Bridenbaugh court,
the Second Circuit in Swedenburg expressly bypassed a "core
concern" analysis, and instead construed Section 2 of the Twenty-
First Amendment as an exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
B. Decisions Invalidating Direct Shipment Laws
Since 2002, the federal courts of appeals for the Fourth,112 Fifth,11 3
Sixth,"4 and Eleventh"5 Circuits have struck down state direct
shipment laws as violative of the dormant Commerce Clause. All
four cases involved state statutes that prohibited direct shipment
to in-state consumers from out-of-state sellers yet provided excep-
tions that allowed in-state wineries to ship directly to in-state
consumers." 6 With the exception of the Eleventh Circuit in Bain
108. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2nd Cir. 2004).
109. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAw § 100(1) (2004).
110. See Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 229 n.3.
111. Id. at 229-30.
112. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
113. Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
114. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003).
115. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
116. Heald, 342 F.3d at 521 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1113(9), which permitted
licensed Michigan winemakers to deliver wine directly to Michigan consumers); Dickerson,
336 F.3d at 393 & n.3 (citing TEX. ALCO. BEv. CODE ANN. § 16.01(a)(4), which permitted in-
state wineries to sell and ship "directly to Texas consumers up to 25,000 gallons" per year);
Beskind, 325 F.3d at 510 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1101(3), amended in 1981 to authorize
in-state wineries to sell and ship wine directly to consumers); Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1106-07
(citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.221(1)(a), which allowed in-state wineries to receive vendors'
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bridge v. Turner,117 each of these courts declared invalid the state
alcohol distribution statute.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Dickerson v. Bailey is representa-
tive of a court's approach under current dormant Commerce Clause
and Twenty-First Amendment frameworks when invalidating direct
shipment laws. The court began its examination by determining
whether the challenged provisions of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Code (TABC) violated the dormant Commerce Clause."' After
noting that the challenged statute allows in-state wineries to
circumvent Texas's three-tiered regulatory system and sell their
product directly to in-state consumers without the mark-up costs
associated with selling to a wholesaler and retailer, 19 and after
discussing the Texas legislature's expressed intent to promote and
market Texas wines,120 the court concluded that the challenged
statute discriminated against out-of-state interests and thus
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
121
The court then moved to the second prong of its analysis,
determining whether the Twenty-First Amendment "saved" the
dormant Commerce Clause violation. 122 To make this determination,
the court used the "core concerns" test, analyzing whether the Texas
statute was passed in furtherance of the core concern of the Twenty-
First Amendment-temperance. 23 The court found that the
expressed intent of the Texas legislature-to promote Texas's wine
industry-in passing the challenged statute revealed that the
regulation was not passed in furtherance of the recognized core
concern of the Twenty-First Amendment, the promotion of temper-
ance.124 Rather, the challenged regulations were "nothing but a
permits).
117. 311 F.3d 1104, 1109, 1115-16 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding that Florida's alcohol
distribution statutes' differentiation between in-state and out-of-state wineries facially
discriminates against interstate commerce, but remanding for further factfinding as to
whether Florida's statutory scheme was "necessary to effectuate the ... core concern [of
revenue raising] in a way that justifies treating out-of-state firms differently from in-state
firms").
118. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 395-403.
119. Id. at 397-99.
120. Id. at 399-400.
121. Id. at 400-03.
122. Id. at 403-07.
123. Id. at 404.
124. Id. at 404, 406-07.
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pretextual rational ... for economic protectionism,"'12 5 a purpose
absolutely proscribed by the Commerce Clause.'26 The court
concluded that the Twenty-First Amendment could not "save" the
discriminatory direct shipment law, and declared the challenged
statute unconstitutional.
In its Dickerson opinion, the Fifth Circuit specifically addressed
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bridenbaugh. Although the court
in Bridenbaugh upheld Indiana's alcohol regulatory statute, the
Dickerson court noted several factual differences between the cases
that accounted for the different results. '27 Indeed, there were factual
anomalies in Bridenbaugh that differentiated it from the direct
shipment cases evaluated by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits.
The primary factual difference was in the regulatory scheme
itself. While the Bridenbaugh court found that "Indiana insists that
every drop of liquor pass through its three-tiered system and be
subject to taxation,"'28 the Michigan, Texas, North Carolina, and
Florida statutes allowed in-state wineries to circumvent the three-
tiered structure. 129 In these states, therefore, the in-state wineries
were not subject to the same taxes as out-of-state wineries.
The plaintiffs in Bridenbaugh, unlike those in the Heald, Beskind,
and Bainbridge cases, consisted solely of oenophiles who had no
intention of acquiring a vendor's permit; no out-of-state wineries
125. Id. at 406-07 (quoting Quality Brands v. Barry, 715 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (D.D.C.
1989)).
126. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 407.
127. Id. at 400-01.
128. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000).
129. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 525 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the Michigan
regulatory scheme benefits in-state wineries by giving them greater access to consumers and
exempting them from the three-tier system); Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 397 (noting that the
Texas statutes allowed in-state wineries to sell and ship directly to in-state consumers,
thereby exempting in-state producers from operating solely within the three-tiered structure);
Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 510 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing a North Carolina provision which
"authorized in-state wine manufacturers to sell and ship their products directly to
consumers"). The Florida regulation challenged in Bainbridge v. Turner regulated direct
shipments by requiring wineries to obtain a vendor's license; this regulation, however, allowed
in-state wineries to bypass the three-tiered system, exempting them from the mark-ups of
selling to wholesalers and retailers. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (11th Cir.
2002).
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were parties. 3 ° The Bridenbaugh plaintiffs were "concerned only
with direct shipments from out-of-state sellers who lack and do not
want Indiana permits."'' Consequently, the plaintiffs were
attempting to access out-of-state wineries who could sell to Indiana
consumers without the burden and costs of obtaining an Indiana
license. In short, the plaintiffs were seeking preferential treatment
for out-of-state sellers.'32 The out-of-state winery plaintiffs in Heald,
Beskind, and Bainbridge, meanwhile, were all willing to pay license
fees and taxes for the right to ship directly to consumers. 33
Though the factual distinctions may account for the different
result in Bridenbaugh, Judge Easterbrook's analysis should also be
questioned. Judge Easterbrook expressly abandoned any "core con-
cern" analysis, deriding such an inspection as an "unilluminating"
speculation into the "mental processes" of the framers of the
Twenty-First Amendment.'34 Yet, although Judge Easterbrook is not
alone in his concern about the ambiguous nature of the legislative
history behind the passage of Section 2,135 the "core concern"
analytical framework was nonetheless announced by the Court as
the appropriate mode of examination for determining a state
statute's constitutionality under the Twenty-First Amendment in
light of the dormant Commerce Clause. 136 Regardless of his
130. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 849. The Dickerson plaintiffs also consisted solely of
oenophiles. The Dickerson & Bridenbaugh opinions can be distinguished by the statutes at
issue. Whereas the Indiana statutes challenged in Bridenbaugh required "every drop of liquor
[to] pass through its three-tiered system." The Texas statutes challenged in Dickerson
provided several exceptions to Texas wineries that allowed these in-state wineries to avoid
the three-tier system. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 400.
131. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 854.
132. The Wilson Act gave states the power to prohibit such a result. See supra text
accompanying notes 64-66.
133. Heald, 342 F.3d at 520-21; Beskind, 325 F.3d at 510-11; Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1114
n.15.
134. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851.
135. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1984) ("No clear consensus
concerning the meaning of [Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment] is apparent."); Cal.
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107 n.10 (1980) ("The
sketchy records of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the thrust of § 2" of the
Twenty-First Amendment).
136. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275 ('"The question in this case is thus whether the
principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment are sufficiently implicated by the
exemption for okolehao and pineapple wine to outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that
would otherwise be offended.") (emphasis added); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S.
691, 714 (1984) ("[T]he central question ... is ... whether the interests implicated by a state
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misgivings, Judge Easterbrook was obligated by stare decisis
principles to follow the constitutional standards detailed in Bacchus
and its progeny, something he clearly failed to do. 3 '
The court's conclusion in Bridenbaugh that the Indiana regula-
tory statute did not discriminate against out-of-state wineries is also
questionable. Though the court admits that the Indiana statute
permits in-state wineries, but forbids those wineries "in the
business of selling... in another state or country," to ship directly to
Indiana consumers,' it sidesteps this issue by pointing out that
permit holders may ship wine produced from any state directly to
consumers.'39 This conclusion misses the point. An Indiana winery
can obtain a permit that allows it to sell directly to in-state consum-
ers, thus allowing it to receive greater profit from its sale by
avoiding the mark-up costs of going through the three-tiered
system. An out-of-state winery, however, does not have this
option.14
The analytical framework adopted by the Second Circuit in
Swedenburg must also be questioned. Following Judge
Easterbrook's lead in Bridenbaugh, the Court dismissed the "core
concern" analysis, concluding that it was "hard pressed to find any
mandate from the [Supreme] Court directing [it] to utilize [the
"core concern" analysis] as a template in analyzing the New York
statute ...."" To the Second Circuit, the core concern analysis used
in Dickerson, Heald, and Bainbridge was improperly "transpose [d]"
from the Supreme Court's opinion in Bacchus Imports; the court
argued that the analytical framework used in Bacchus should be
limited to the facts and arguments offered in that case. " 2
Yet the core concern test itself did not originate with Bacchus
Imports. In Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, '43 the Court considered an
Oklahoma prohibition that barred cable television operators in the
regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that
the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with
express federal policies.") (emphasis added).
137. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 406 (5th Cir. 2003).
138. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851 (quoting IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) (2004)).
139. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853-54.
140. See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1114 n.15 (11th Cir. 2002).
141. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 236 n.10 (2d Cir. 2004).
142. Id.
143. 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
1556 [Vol. 46:1533
WEIGHING IN ON THE WINE WARS
state from airing advertisements of alcoholic beverages contained in
the cable signals that originated out of state. Regulations of the
Federal Communications Commission conflicted with the Oklahoma
statute. The Court inquired "whether the interests implicated by a
state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the
Twenty-First Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwith-
standing that its requirements directly conflict with express federal
policies." 44 The Court struck down the Oklahoma statute, as its ban
of alcohol advertising did not relate to the core concerns of the
Twenty-First Amendment:
the application of Oklahoma's advertising ban to the importation
of distant signals by cable television operators engages only
indirectly the central power reserved by [section] 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment-that of exercising "control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to
structure the liquor distribution system."'45
Thus, contrary to the Second Circuit's claim, the core concern
analysis has not been, and should not be, limited to the facts of
Bacchus; rather, it has been applied repeatedly when a state
regulation of alcohol, based on Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment, conflicts with federal authority.
V. A COMPARATIVE LOOK TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW
As one federal court of appeals has recently pointed out, the
Supreme Court has been "less than prolific" in expounding on its
analysis of the Twenty-First Amendment's "core concerns" since its
1984 decision in Bacchus. 46 This lack of clarity has led not only to
confusion among courts in determining what is a "core concern" of
the Twenty-First Amendment-aside from temperance-but has
also led to confusion regarding the necessity of engaging in "core
144. Id. at 714.
145. Id. at 715 (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97,
110 (1980)); see also Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 523 (2003) (tracing the Court's use of the
core concern test to Capital Cities).
146. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 2003).
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concerns" analysis. 147 In the absence of a clear standard set by the
Court to determine the appropriate constitutional balance between
the rights of states to regulate the shipment of alcohol to consumers
and the federal interest in maintaining a free market interstate
economy, consideration of another court system's attempt to strike
a balance between these two interests is illuminating. The EU
provides a particularly useful comparative study because its
competing interests in this area are quite analogous to those in the
United States.
A. Why Look to the European Union?
The essential dilemma of the "wine wars"' 48 -protecting state
sovereignty with respect to alcohol regulation while also maintain-
ing a free market economy that prohibits discrimination between
states-is not unique to the United States. The EU, whose Treaty
of the European Economic Community (EEC) provides for a common
market and prohibits discrimination in the free movement of goods
between member states, has had much litigation over its member
states' ability to set standards and guidelines in their regulation of
the movement of alcohol.149 In fact, much of the ECJ's case law
interpreting the Treaty's provisions regarding free movement of
goods has arisen from alcohol importation-related litigation. 50
The European Union of today is the result of a series of treaties
ratified among the Member States since 1951. The Treaty of Paris,
147. Compare Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 406 (5th Cir. 2003) 227 F.3d at 851
(abandoning"core concern" analysis), withBridenbaughv. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848,851
(7th Cir. 2000), 336 F.3d at 406 (concluding that the court is obligated to follow the Bacchus
"core concern" standard).
148. The term "wine wars" was used in Susan Lorde Martin's review of direct shipment
litigation in state courts. See Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars-Direct Shipment of Wine: The
Twenty-First Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Consumers'Rights, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 1
(2000); see also Susan Lorde Martin, Changing the Law: Update from the Wine War, 17 J.L.
& POL. 63 (2001).
149. See, e.g., Case 178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227
[1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780 (1987) (reviewing German beer purity requirements); Case 176/84,
Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E.C.R. 1193, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 813 (1987) (reviewing
Greek beer purity standards); Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
fiur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649 (1979) [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon] (reviewing a minimum
alcoholic strength requirement).
150. See, e.g., Hellenic Republic, 1987 E.C.R. at 1193; Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 649;
Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837 (1974).
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to which France, Italy, West Germany, and the Benelux countries
consented, created the European Coal and Steel Community in
1951.1"l The next move toward the "federation of Europe" occurred
in 1957 with the two Treaties of Rome, establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic
Community (EEC).152 Since its establishment in 1957, the principal
concern of the EEC has been to establish an internal free trade area
between member states.153 To accomplish this objective, the Treaties
of Rome eliminated customs duties on imports and exports between
the Member States and abolished obstacles to freedom of movement
between Member States for persons, services, and capital."'
Although the Treaties of Rome went a long way in setting the
framework for a single European market, they were less than
exhaustive.
The objective of the single market and the method by which the
European Community would reach this goal was set out in the
European Commission's 1985 White Paper. 155 This report contained
nearly 300 proposals to remove physical, technical, and fiscal
barriers to trade throughout the European Community.156 The
Single European Act, implemented in 1987, amended the treaties on
which the European Community was based to incorporate these
proposals, and it established the goal of completing the single
market by 1992.157
The process toward a single European market took a dramatic
step forward in 1992 with the ratification of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty). The Maastricht Treaty re-
vamped the EEC Treaty by transforming it into one of three
"pillars" that make up the broader EU.'58 The Maastricht Treaty
continued the path towards a single market by ensuring "more open
borders for Member States in the movement of goods, labor, and
151. Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some
Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1623 (2002).
152. Id. at 1623-24.
153. See KAREN V. KOLE & ANTHON D'AMATO, EUROPEAN UNION LAW ANTHOLOGY 9 (1998).
154. See LUCIE A. CARSWELL & XAVIER DE SARRAu, LAW & BUSINESS IN THE EUROPEAN
SINGLE MARKET § 1.02 (1st ed. 1993).
155. See id.
156. See KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 153, at 10.
157. See id.
158. Young, supra note 151, at 1624.
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capital. 159 Most notably, it provided for a single institutional
framework for the Member States and set the time table for
establishing a common monetary policy for all Member States,
including a single European currency and a central European
bank.16
As the goal of establishing a single European market has
developed, the powers of the EU have expanded into areas once
controlled solely by Member States. Much like how Article I of the
U.S. Constitution delegates powers to Congress to regulate certain
matters, the treaties of the European Union specifically assign
"competence," or power, to Community institutions to regulate
specific areas.161 Beyond these explicitly listed competences, Article
235 of the Treaty of Rome contains a "necessary and proper"
provision that allows the Community institutions to regulate other
areas. 162
Concurrent with the Treaties' explicit grant of competences to
Community institutions, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has
been aggressive in expanding and solidifying the EU's power to
regulate activities in Member States. Despite the absence of any
"supremacy clause" in the EU treaties, the ECJ has asserted the
supremacy of Community law over national legal norms. 63 In
addition, the ECJ has held that some Community law has "direct
effect" to Member State law-that is, legislation and regulations
passed by the Community do not need to be drafted into the laws of
the individual Member States but instead apply directly to these
States once the Community passes the regulation. 64 Finally, the
ECJ has also developed an "implied powers" doctrine, which holds
that Community competence is exclusive in certain areas, thus
prohibiting Member State legislation in areas where the Commu-
nity itself has not acted. 165
159. KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 153, at 654.
160. See id. at 10-11.
161. Young, supra note 151, at 1633.
162. Id. at 1633-34.
163. Id. at 1634.
164. Id. at 1634 (citing Case 26/62, Algemene Transport-en Expedetie Onderneming van
Gend en Loos NV v. Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [19631 2
C.M.L.R. 105 (1963)).
165. Young, supra note 151, at 1635.
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The ECJ's aggressive expansion of Community power at the
expense of Member State autonomy has not gone unnoticed. The
Community responded in 1992 by including in the Maastricht
Treaty the principle of "subsidiarity."1 This concept is based on the
principle that the lowest level of government possible should take
action.'67 Thus, "the Community shall take action ... only if ... the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and therefore by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community."16 18 Yet
the introduction of this principle into the Maastricht Treaty has not
quieted Member States' fears that their autonomy has been usurped
by the expansion of the EU. Recently, the British Minister of Europe
complained of the "creeping federalism" taking effect in the EU,
noting that "[t]he powers have all been going towards Brussels and
away from nation states."169
These federalism concerns make the ECJ's jurisprudence
regarding Member State alcohol regulation particularly analogous
to the direct shipment "wine wars" being fought in U.S. courts.
While the U.S. courts are concerned about states' rights to regulate
the importation of alcohol under the Twenty-First Amendment in
light of the dormant Commerce Clause, the ECJ must balance the
Community's interest in maintaining a free market economy against
the powers traditionally afforded Member States to regulate alcohol
for the purpose of protecting the health and lives of its citizens.17 °
Furthermore, a closer look at ECJ jurisprudence regarding the
authority of Member States to regulate the importation of alcohol
reveals that the arguments offered by Member States in defense of
their alcohol regulations mirror those asserted in support of
American states' alcohol regulations. In the face of European
Commission challenges to Member State alcohol regulations on the
grounds of impermissible restrictions to free trade, Member States
166. Id. at 1636.
167. See KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 153, at 67.
168. Young, supra note 151, at 1636 (quoting Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3b, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (as in effect in 1957) (now article 5)
[hereinafter EC Treaty]).
169. Young, supra note 151, at 1614 (quoting Andrew Grice, Hain Warns of "Creeping
Federalism" in EU, INDEP., July 22, 2002, at 1).
170. See Case 178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227,
[1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780 (1987).
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cite their inherent police powers as the justification for their alcohol
regulations.171 In the United States, the Supreme Court has
identified "temperance" as the primary legitimate basis for alcohol
regulations under the Twenty-First Amendment.172 The basis for the
state's authority to regulate alcohol prior to the passage of the
Twenty-First Amendment was the state's inherent police power.
Thus, the root of both EU Member States and American states'
desire to engage in alcohol regulation is the same-the need to use
their inherent police powers to protect the health of their citizens.
A comparative look to the ECJ's jurisprudence is also appropriate,
because it has been given the Supreme Court's imprimatur. As
recently as the 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas,173 and often in
habeas corpus petitions regarding the imposition of the death
penalty,174 the Court has looked to foreign courts, such as the
European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of
Canada, to help guide its decisions. Although the Court's use of
foreign jurisprudence generally occurs in cases involving questions
of human rights, at least one Justice has looked to the European
Community to guide his construction of an American regulatory
statute.175 It is evident, then, that the Supreme Court has found
comparisons with foreign courts' jurisprudence regarding an
analogous issue to be instructive and helpful in certain cases.
B. How the ECJ Addresses Member State Alcohol Regulations
In its free movement of goods jurisprudence, the ECJ looks to
Treaty Articles 28 through 36 for guidance on the EU's interest in
regulating inter-Member State commerce. To create a common
market, the European Community sought to strike down all tariffs
and customs that restricted trade. Article 30 achieved this goal, as
it prohibits "quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
171. See id.; Case 176/84, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E.C.R. 1193, [1988] 1
C.M.L.R. 813 (1987).
172. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
173. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
174. See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992-93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988).
175. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 557-59 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the drafters of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 intended a
system similar to the European "play it by ear" system).
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having equivalent effect ... between Member States." '176 The ECJ
construed this provision broadly in Procureur du Roi v.
Dassonville.177 The court held that "[a]ll trading rules enacted by
member-States which are capable of hindering, directly or indi-
rectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be
considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative
restrictions. 178
Because the EU is composed of nations with long histories,
distinct cultures, and independent legislatures, the greatest
obstacles to trade between Member States have been due to
disparities in national legislation regarding the characteristics of
goods.179 Initially, most believed that Article 30 merely prohibited
discriminatory measures against imports; that is, as long as
Member States applied their legislation without distinction between
national goods and imports, they would not violate Article 30.1s0 In
1976, the ECJ dispelled that belief with its Cassis de Dijon
decision. '
Cassis de Dijon involved German legislation that set a minimum
alcoholic strength of twenty-five percent for fruit wines, which led
the Federal Monopoly Administration for Spirits to refuse import
authorization."12 The German government argued that the legisla-
tion was intended to prevent alcoholism by reducing the availability
of drinks with a low alcohol content that could lead to alcohol
tolerance. 8 3 In response, the ECJ noted that Member States have
the power to regulate alcohol:
In the absence of common rules ... relating to the production and
marketing of alcohol ... it is for the Member State to regulate all
matters relating to the production and marketing of alcohol and
alcoholic beverages on their own territory .... Obstacles to
movement within the Community resulting from disparities
between the national laws relating to the marketing of the
176. EEC Treaty art. 30 (as in effect in 1957) (now article 28).
177. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 14 C.M.L.R. 436 (1974).
178. See id.
179. KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 153, at 105.
180. See id. at 106.
181. Id. (citing Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649 (1979)).
182. KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 153, at 116.
183. See CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 154, § 6.05[5].
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products in question must be accepted in so far as those provi-
sions may be recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effective-
ness of... the protection of public health ... and the defence of the
consumer.I14
The ECJ then applied a strict scrutiny-like test and held that the
legislation was invalid under any of these "mandatory requirement"
grounds, because consumer protection could have been achieved by
less discriminatory means.'85
The ECJ's recognition of the "mandatory requirements" that
Member States can use as a legitimate basis to create an obstacle to
trade is analogous to U.S. courts recognition that states have the
right to impede the interstate movement of alcohol when the
regulation is constructed and implemented, in the least discrimina-
tory way possible, for the purpose of temperance. Just as Section 2
of the Twenty-First Amendment explicitly confers to states this
regulatory power, Article 36 of the Maastricht Treaty allows EU
Member States to restrict trade for the purposes of, among others,
public morality and the protection of health.8 6
The ECJ has limited the ability of Member States to justify their
import restrictions on the basis of Article 36. In two cases involving
beer purity standards that the ECJ decided on the same day,8 7 the
court struck down the Member State laws as invalid under Article
30. Both cases involved national laws that rigorously controlled the
ingredients for beer and prohibited the importation of all beers that
did not meet this standard. The court noted that the laws were "out
of proportion with the aim pursued"-protecting the health of the
Member States' citizens.' Consequently, the court concluded that
the laws prohibiting the import of beer could not be justified under
Article 36 of the Treaty. 1
89
184. Id. (citing Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 662 (1979)) (emphasis added).
185. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 154, § 6.05[5].
186. See KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 153, at 119.
187. Case 178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, [1988]
1 C.M.L.R. 780 (1987) (German beer purity case); Case 176/84, Commission v. Hellenic
Republic, 1987 E.C.R. 1193, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 813 (1987) (Greek beer purity case).
188. See Hellenic Republic, 1987 E.C.R. at 1193.
189. Id.
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While Cassis de Dijion and the beer purity cases involved import
prohibitions based on the characteristics of the alcohol rather than
on the manner in which alcohol was prohibited, Article 95 of the
Maastricht Treaty addresses how the ECJ should handle a direct
shipment law case in which an outside winery is forced to pay more
taxes and more mark-up fees. Article 95 provides two bases for
assessing the discriminatory element in taxation systems.' 90 It
provides:
No Member States shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the
products of other Member States any internal taxation of any
kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar
domestic products.
Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products
of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature
as to afford indirect protection to other products. 9'
In applying this provision of the Treaty, the court has not demanded
statistical proof that the taxation violates Article 95. Rather, the
Member State challenging another's taxation must "showo that a
given tax mechanism is likely ... to bring about the protective effect
referred to by the Treaty."'192 For a Member State to demonstrate
such a protective effect, the tax must merely be "capable of influenc-
ing consumer choice and reducing potential consumption of the
imported products." '193
An example of the ECJ's interpretation of Article 95 is found in
a 1980 case involving a United Kingdom tax statute that subjected
wine to a higher excise duty than beer.194 To determine whether the
tax on wine offended section 2 of Article 95 required the court to
determine whether wine and beer had a competitive relationship,
such that a tax on wine would "afford indirect protection" to beer
producers.195 The court defined a competitive relationship as one
that allows for a "degree of substitution" between the products, and
it held that beer and wine held similar roles, consequently striking
190. See KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 153, at 147.
191. Id. at 147-48.
192. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 154, at § 6.04[3].
193. Id.
194. Case 170/78, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1980 E.C.R. 417 (1980).
195. Id. at 418.
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down the law.196 Thus, the ECJ again strictly curtailed Member
States' ability to restrict the free trade of alcohol in the name of
protecting the citizens of the Member State.
C. Analogizing ECJ Analytical Structure to Direct Shipment Law
Framework
In evaluating whether an import restriction violates the
Maastricht Treaty, the ECJ undergoes an analytical approach that
is analogous to that used by U.S. courts in addressing a direct
shipment law. First, the ECJ questions whether the challenged
statute violates Community law mandating the free movement of
goods. If the court determines that the Member State regulation
restricts the quantity of the applicable goods coming into the
Member State, either through a regulation of the manufacturing of
the good or through a tax that produces a protective effect for a
similar domestic product, then a per se violation is found.197 This
analysis is similar to the U.S. approach, which finds a per se
violation of the Commerce Clause if a state statute discriminates on
its face or in effect against out-of-state economic interests.
198
After determining that the challenged statute violates the
Masstricht Treaty's provisions for the free movement of goods, the
ECJ then examines whether the "mandatory provisions" of Article
36 "save" the regulation.'99 The ECJ applies a strict scrutiny test
to this examination: "in view of the principle of proportionality
underlying the last sentence of Article 36 of the Treaty, [Member
States must] restrict themselves to what is actually necessary to
secure the protection of public health."200 This approach mirrors the
U.S. courts' examination of whether the Twenty-First Amendment
"saves" a state alcohol regulation that violates the Commerce
Clause.201 To conclude that the state statute is saved by the Twenty-
196. Id. at 434. The court concluded that "it is impossible to restrict oneself to consumer
habits in a Member State" to appropriately judge substitutability, since the tax laws of a
Member State could "crystallize given consumer habits." Id.
197. See, e.g., Case 176/84, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E.C.R. 1193, [1988] 1
C.M.L.R. 813 (1987).
198. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2003).
199. See, e.g., Hellenic Republic, 1987 E.C.R. at 1194.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1109-10 (11th Cir. 2002).
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First Amendment, the statute must advance "a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscrim-
inatory alternatives."2 °2 Thus, in both the EU and the United States,
a regulation that restricts the sale of alcohol between states can
only be justified as an effort to promote temperance and should only
be upheld if it is so narrowly written that it in fact works to promote
temperance while having a minimal effect on interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the European Court of Justice and the U.S.
courts must address a similar problem-balancing the federal
interest in regulating interstate commerce against states' autonomy
interests in regulating alcohol. This Note contends that U.S. courts
can learn from the European Union, specifically in the application
of Article 95. That provision expressly prohibits any taxation that
may give indirect protection to local Member State economic
interests. That principle is also represented in the Twenty-First
Amendment, which gives states the right to regulate alcohol but
only to the extent that it does not prejudice out-of-state interests.0 3
The Court recognized this principle in Craig v. Boren, when it noted
the framers' "clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce
Clause framework" of nondiscrimination that was formed in the
Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts.2"4
U.S. courts can learn from the ECJ's interpretation of Article 95.
A tax need not be overtly discriminatory or oppressive to be invalid;
instead, the ECJ has held that a challenged statute is invalid
simply if it influences consumer choice and may potentially
reduce consumption of imported products.0 5 Using the ECJ's
broader definition of "discrimination" in deciding Bridenbaugh may
have produced a very different outcome in that case. Though the
Bridenbaugh court conceded that the challenged Indiana statute
allows in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers while
forbidding out-of-state wineries to do the same, it held that there
202. Id.
203. See discussion supra Part III.A.
204. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976).
205. See generally CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 154, § 6.04.
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was no functional discrimination in the Indiana system because all
wine, whether produced in-state or out-of-state, is regulated and
taxed.2"6 Yet, viewed through the ECJ lens, the Indiana statute
cannot stand. Because only in-state wineries have the opportunity
to ship directly to consumers, consumers who prefer directly-
shipped wines are limited to selecting only Indiana wines. If enough
Indiana consumers limit their wine purchases to those that can be
directly shipped, the potential consumption of out-of-state wines
drops dramatically. Under the ECJ's interpretation of its free trade
law, this impact on out-of-state wines is sufficient to demonstrate a
prohibited protective effect.
The dormant Commerce Clause, like Article 95, prohibits state
laws that produce such protective effects, and the Twenty-First
Amendment limits state regulation of alcohol to nondiscriminatory
measures, much as the Maastricht Treaty does. As a result, U.S.
courts should follow the lead of their European counterparts and
construe "discrimination" in a similar manner in direct shipment
cases.
Jonathan W. Garlough
206. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000).
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